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 Abstract 
Statistical disclosure control (SDC) in a research environment poses particular problems. 
Most SDC research is concerned with ensuring that a finite set of tabular outputs are safe 
from disclosure, or that microdatasets are sufficiently anonymised. By its nature, a research 
environment is one where confidential data is made available for analysis with very few 
restrictions. Imposing SDC rules not designed specifically for this environment may lead to 
excessively complex rules which still fail to achieve the objectives of flexibility and 
effectiveness. 
 
This paper argues that the research environment requires a different approach to traditional 
SDC based on a small collection of simple rules with a necessary “fuzziness” in 
interpretation. This requires (a) clear agreement on the principles and general purpose of 
SDC (b) the demonstration of classes of safe and unsafe outputs and (c) the active 
involvement of researchers.  However, this does raise a number of practical issues. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Historically the role of national statistical institutes (NSIs) has been to collect large amounts 
of information on all aspects of individuals and businesses. The publication of tables of 
aggregate data from these sources is the core function of NSIs. However, in recent years the 
research potential from using the underlying microdata has grown in importance. 
 
Most NSIs provide some sort of access to microdata, although the extent of this varies 
considerably across countries and across data types. For example, there is widespread 
access to social data, as this can be anonymised effectively without damaging the 
information content significantly. In contrast, the use of business data is typically much more 
restricted, and little, if any, perturbation or anonymisation is carried out. 
 
In terms of the access methods, circulation of confidential data is often restricted by the use 
of special licences or by remote job submission models, as in Australia and New Zealand. A 
number of NSIs also provide dedicated laboratory facilities for research into disclosive 
microdata. This may be at a physically controlled location (as in the US, Canada, Italy or 
Germany) or through a “virtual lab” (as in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands). 
 
New technology, particularly the development of user-friendly thin client systems, has made 
the provision of lab facilities increasingly appealing1. The result is that demands upon NSIs 
to improve access to data are increasingly being met by innovative lab solutions. Along with 
flexible remote job submission systems, the provision of “research environments” (where 
manipulation of data and the choice of statistical models are both largely unrestricted) is 
therefore growing strongly. 
 
This growth in use of research environments presents a problem for statistical disclosure 
control (SDC)2. The typical focus of SDC has been on ensuring the non-disclosiveness of 
aggregates or, in recent years, generating non-disclosive datasets for research use (often 
                                                 
1
 A “thin-client” system is where processing is carried out on a remote computer; the client computer appears to interact fully 
with the data but only sends instructions and sees the output of the operation. “Fat-client” systems are where processing is 
carried out by the client machine. “Remote job submission” is when a program is sent to a remote computer for execution and 
the results of the program returned; there is no direct interaction with the data. 
The main benefits of thin client systems are simplified data management, improved security, and the decoupling of location 
from access. The last two are particularly appealing for NSIs, but while thin-client processing is historically the default operating 
mode for large computer systems, it is only in the last decade that thin-client solutions for Microsoft Windows™ systems have 
become viable for suppliers and users. Hence, recent years have seen a strong growth in the provision of lab environments. 
 
2
 Although disclosure detection and control are two distinct concepts, in this paper for simplicity we use SDC to cover both, 
distinguishing where necessary. 
 
called “public use” files). There is a large literature on SDC in respect of aggregates and 
public use files. 
 
However, SDC for disclosive microdata in a research environment requires a different 
approach. The key problem is the predictability of outputs. This makes the scenario-based 
modelling used to evaluate the safety of public-use files, for example, difficult to use 
effectively. 
 
Compared to regular SDC research, there is almost no literature on this. The Journal of 
Official Statistics special edition on disclosure limitation (Feinberg and Willenborg, 1998) did 
not discuss research environments in any one of its thirteen papers. Recent international 
conferences have focused on either the physical aspects of safe settings, or on preparing 
safe files for distribution (see, for example, UN (2004, 2006, 2008); Domingo-Ferrer and 
Torra (2004), Domingo-Ferrer and Franconi (2006). The European Statistical System 
programme includes research into output disclosure for the first time in the ESSNet project, 
commencing in 2008. Apart from Reznek (2004), Corscadden et al (2006) Steel and Reznek 
(2006), and Ritchie (2006a, 2006b), which all discuss the release of analytical outputs, there 
appears to be little analysis of some of the general problems that arise when researchers are 
given free rein over data. 
 
Partly this reflects the set-up of NSI research centres. These are often a small part of the 
NSI, operating with relative independence and staffed by experts with practical experience of 
relevant research. SDC knowledge is embodied in research centre staff.  
 
However, there is a need now for a discussion of what constitutes effective SDC in a 
research environment. This has five drivers. First, with the increasing sharing of international 
data (particularly in the EU) there is concern over the lack of agreement on SDC standards, 
which reduces the likelihood of cross-border data sharing. Second, the increasing amount of 
research work being carried out has raised the profile of research, while the lack of any 
discussion has led to attempts to take SDC rules designed for aggregate outputs and 
anonymisation, and apply them to research outputs. This can be ineffective, irrelevant and 
needlessly bureaucratic; and at worst the blind application of inappropriate rules can be 
devastating for research. Third, the range of analysis carried out in research environments 
goes far beyond the traditional models used for designing SDC rules. Fourth, with increasing 
requests for potentially disclosive data to be made available to off-site facilities, there is a 
need for transparency in SDC procedures so that data used securely at an NSI retains its 
confidentiality when management is transferred to, for example, secure research centres at 
universities. Finally, while SDC for aggregation and anonymisation is regularly tested and 
developed, the lack of discussion about rules for research outputs means that there is little 
independent scrutiny of the internal rules the research centre managers have developed; nor 
is there much sharing of “best practice”. 
 
This paper aims to address these issues, particularly the last. It argues that SDC in a 
research environment requires a fundamentally different approach to proscriptive rules-
based methods – the “principles-example” approach. This recognises explicitly the 
limitations of trying to specify exact rules, and places the focus on an understanding of 
principles to which rules can be more flexibly tied. This has implications both for the training 
of researchers and for the use of automated systems. 
 
The next section comments on the research environment. We then look at the problems of 
applying hard-and-fast rules for disclosure control, and argue that the nature of the research 
environment means that rules are fundamentally difficult to specify. The following section 
suggests an approach based around very simple rules but complex application. This 
requires some education of both researchers and NSIs, and the criteria for approving 
outputs become necessarily complex. We conclude with an example from the UK, and some 
comments on sharing information. 
2. The characteristics of the research environment 
 
Most SDC is concerned with making aggregate tables safe, or with effectively anonymising 
microdata. This is a practical objective, because in most cases a finite set of tables, or 
“intruder” scenarios, can be specified, and the resulting “safe” data can be measured against 
these targets. 
 
The contradistinction of a research environment is the unpredictability of outputs. 
Researchers produce tables, but those tables may be a world away from aggregate tables 
produced from the same data. Data may be stretched, twisted and combined in unexpected 
ways. Researchers may apply a very personal treatment to missing or out-of-scope 
variables, or may use unexpected sub-samples of the data. Data can also be combined from 
a variety of sources. 
 
Moving away from linear aggregates, the range of research outputs expands considerably: 
linear and non-linear estimation, simulation, probabilistic modelling, Bayesian analysis, factor 
analysis, dynamic modelling, transition data, et cetera. After all, the reason for providing 
access to microdata is to allow researchers to explore a range of analysis which is not 
possible from simple linear aggregation, or which cannot be easily defined by an automatic 
process. 
 
A basic statistical competency on the part of the researchers can be expected. All NSIs 
apply some level of checking into the background and qualifications of researchers. This is 
done partly to ensure that the work carried out on the data is scientifically valid, but also to 
lower the demands upon the NSI. While NSIs assist researchers in data-related questions, 
they would not normally expect to offer statistical mentoring. 
 
In summary, we define a research environment as one where expert researchers have 
largely unrestricted access to disclosive data to produce an unpredictable set of outputs; and 
where it is neither desirable nor practical to fully specify ex ante modelling methods or data 
transformations to be used 
 
We assume, for the purposes of this paper, that the researchers in the lab can be trusted not 
to deliberately misuse the data; and that the technical security of the lab is acceptable. 
These are important, but separate concerns; for a discussion, see for example Desai (2004) 
or Ritchie (2006b). 
3. Difficulties with rules-based methods in a research environment 
 
All SDC is based upon rules which are intended to guarantee the level of disclosure 
protection. These are designed to provide a clear, independent and verifiable set of 
standards, and are essential for production of non-disclosive aggregates or anonymised 
datasets. 
 
Our purpose is not to argue that rules per se are inappropriate; instead, we argue that the 
nature of a research environment is such that trying to define an SDC strategy based largely 
upon rules which do not take full account of the range of transformations available is almost 
doomed to failure. This is because the unpredictability of outputs inevitably turns any general 
rules into a complex set of special cases.  
 
We illustrate this by considering simple primary disclosure (that is, the risk of disclosure in a 
cell without reference to any other cells). A typical threshold rule could be: 
 a table for release must have a frequency of at least five observations underlying any 
displayed cell 
 
This is the sort of rule applied to aggregate data: for example, total turnover by industry. The 
cell limit might be based upon what the NSI thinks are the possibilities for collusion – in this 
case, a limit of five implies that the NSI believes that at most three respondents will collude 
to determine the implied values for a fourth party. On this assumption (and ignoring any 
possibility of secondary disclosure and dominating values for the moment), this rule 
guarantees the confidentiality of the microdata. 
 
While this may be appropriate when the data is itself disclosive and can be easily identified 
with the data donor, this is overly restrictive when these conditions do not hold.  
 
First, consider the disclosiveness of the data. A transformation may render this rule 
irrelevant. For example, if productivity per employee is being displayed, small numbers may 
not be a cause for concern: the ratio does not allow individual survey responses to be 
unpicked.  
 
The threshold rule can then be amended: 
 
…unless the data has been transformed 
 
However, this information might still be potentially useful. Suppose growth in turnover per 
employee was being displayed. While the original survey returns could not be determined 
from such a complex variable, the information on how a company’s productivity changes 
may be commercially sensitive. The NSI may well consider this a breach of confidentiality, 
and so once more the rule needs to be amended: 
 
…and the resulting information does not breach confidentiality 
 
However, this information may already be in the public domain. Growth in productivity per 
employee could be approximated by growth in gross profits per employee; if the company is 
incorporated, then this information is likely to be available from published company 
accounts. As the information being gleaned from the survey returns is qualitatively identical 
to that available from public documents, the confidentiality criterion is not being breached: 
 
…by providing information which is not available from public sources 
  
However, if the information is not readily available then the NSI may be under an obligation 
to not provide commercially sensitive information: 
 
…easily… 
 
Moreover, even if similar information is available publicly and easily, the NSI may still feel 
that allowing any inferences to be drawn from survey responses (for example, which could 
corroborate uncertain public information) would breach its confidentiality protocols. There 
may also be legal restrictions – that information supplied in confidence, even if ratified by 
public knowledge, may not be published by the NSI. 
 
Turning to the issue of identification, this at least seems amenable to a simple rule. To an 
extent this is the case, but again there are hidden issues. First, the range of direct identifiers 
(name, address, industry, location) varies across data sets. The context of that identifier is 
also important. For example: 
 
• in the UK a postcode is sufficient to identify any medium-sized business, but an 
individual or household only in very exceptional circumstances 
• a five-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code may have hundreds of 
companies in one industry, and yet only contain one company in another industry, 
such as a government monopoly 
• in health statistics, certain events (such as rare cancers) are strong identifiers 
because of their rarity; others (such as birth) are strong identifiers because of their 
ubiquity in other datasets 
• geography per se is rarely disclosive; but in combination with other variables it almost 
always becomes one of the key identifiers (see Elliot (2004) for an example) 
 
More intractably, the underlying data may not be collected at the relative identification level. 
Consider the case of UK New Earnings Survey data. This is a 1% sample of employees, but 
collected from companies. Although tables may have over five observations in each cell, this 
only counts the number of employees. It is quite possible that the employees in a cell might 
all come from one company (for example, if the table shows specialised occupations in a 
nationalised industry). If the NSI’s disclosure rules are based upon identification of company 
returns, a cell with high-frequency data may still violate the NSI rules. 
 A similar example could be drawn for plant-level (as opposed to company-level) data, or for 
personal data where the characteristics of individuals may lead to identification through the 
family unit. The cell count may be irrelevant; what matters is the frequency of the unit of 
identification. 
 
Without identification, data releases cannot be disclosive. But a combination of factors 
contribute to identifiability, which is very dependent upon context. 
 
In summary, the simple rule has now grown to: 
 
a table for release must have a frequency of at least five observations of the relevant 
disclosure control unit underlying any displayed cell unless the data has been 
transformed and the resulting information does not breach confidentiality by providing 
information which is not easily available from public sources 
 
This is a good deal more complex and addresses some of the above issues. Unfortunately, 
as a model for disclosure detection this is difficult to make operational. A phrase such as “not 
easily available” is an essential part of the rule, but impossible to specify in the general case. 
The phrasing is deliberately vague to cover all cases, but as a result does not cover explicitly 
any one case. 
 
The definition also embodies a tautology: the data is non-disclosive when it has been 
transformed, and the data has been transformed when it is non-disclosive. There is no 
independent line which says “this is transformed data”. 
 
The rule only mentions identification implicitly in the minimum cell count, as this is difficult to 
specify in a general rule which is meaningful. 
  
Finally, the rule explicitly recognises that the relevant disclosure control unit may not even be 
part of the table. 
 
In short, this “rule” has become a guideline which needs to be interpreted. 
 
Disclosure control of linear aggregates is of course extremely difficult because of the 
potential for disclosure by differencing. The aim of the paper is not to set up straw men; 
threshold rules are the core of identification. However, this paper argues that the threshold 
rule should be not be seen as an end in itself, but as encapsulating the principles of the SDC 
– and hence needing to be evaluated in context. 
4. Deriving of rules: the research zoo 
 
Part of the difficulty with developing ever more complex rules is the manner in which they are 
determined. While fundamental rules such as the simple threshold rule above can be derived 
from first principles, the more complex derivations required a sequence of “what-if” 
scenarios. 
 
This approach is typically used when testing the disclosiveness of public-use datasets. A 
dataset believed to be safe may be subject to testing by applying a number of “attack” 
scenarios. If potentially dangerous cells or observations are identified, then the control 
mechanism may be adjusted and re-applied. Alternatively, the result of the analysis may 
lead to rules determining safe tabulations. 
 
The key to the use of scenarios is that the data under consideration form something 
approaching a “closed” system. In the case of aggregate results, the form of the output is 
known. For public-use datasets, the final form of outputs derived from data is not known, but 
the level of uncertainty around each observation can be assessed. Estimates of the 
probability of re-identification can be derived (see, for example, Elliott and Manning 2004), 
and the appropriate recoding or rules defined. While scenario testing cannot obviously cover 
every possibility, a finite set of plausible attacks can be defined. 
 
A research environment with disclosive data is an “open” system. The person responsible for 
deriving rules must not just test the safety of results, but must also predict what form those 
results take. Ex ante, this is a much more difficult proposition.  
 
An analogy might be to imagine disclosure control as providing an enclosure for animals 
which keeps the animals safe and alive. In respect of aggregate data and public-use 
datasets, the aim of disclosure detection is to probe the strength of the fences, walls etc, and 
to make sure the contained animals are prospering. The problem with research 
environments is that the SDC personnel must try to do this without knowing in advance 
whether the residents will be birds, fish, insects… Hence, all rules become contingency 
rules. SDC in a research environment is designing a zoo, not assessing a cage. 
5. The principle-example approach to SDC in a research environment 
 
The above discussion is necessarily an oversimplification of SDC development. 
Nevertheless, the implication is clear: trying to derive hard-and-fast rules to cover all the 
eventualities of a research environment is almost certainly doomed to failure. 
 
But, as discussed in the Introduction, there is a need for some sort of “standard” which can 
be applied in a research environment. How can this circle be squared? 
 
The solution lies in a different approach to SDC. This is based around four key issues: 
understanding on principles; few and simple, but flexible, rules; the explicit modelling of 
functional forms rather than data, wherever possible; and the education of researchers. The 
first two are to some extent already embodied in SDC, but it is in the latter two that the 
difference in approach needed by a research environment becomes important. 
 
5.1 Understanding of principles 
 
SDC in a research environment is not something that can be carried out automatically. It 
requires understanding of the outputs being checked, the potential disclosure risks, and the 
level of acceptable risk. Therefore a key issue is that there is agreement on the aims and 
objectives of SDC. This is not the same as agreeing rules; the principles may be common 
across an NSI, but different areas may implement the rules in different ways. 
 
For example, the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) Code of Practice (ONS 2002a) 
defines a Statement of Principles for “Protecting Confidentiality”; the associated Protocol on 
Data Access and Confidentiality suggests how the principles might be interpreted in practice: 
 
…Statistical disclosure control methods may modify the data or the design of the 
statistic, or a combination of both. They will be judged sufficient when the guarantee of 
confidentiality can be maintained, taking account of information likely to be available to 
third parties, either from other sources or as previously released National Statistics 
outputs, against the following standard: 
 
It would take a disproportionate amount of time, effort and expertise for an 
intruder to identify a statistical unit to others, or to reveal information about 
that unit not already in the public domain. 
ONS (2004) pp7-4 
 This is intended to give a generally comprehensible view of why results may not be released. 
Note that it does not specify any absolute standard of SDC, but uses “likely” and 
“disproportionate” to indicate where judgement is needed. There are no specific rules or 
parameters, and nothing about preferred control measures. Nevertheless, this is the ultimate 
standard against which all SDC activities must be measured. 
 
5.2 Soft rules 
 
Flexibility in the application of rules is essential for effective SDC in a research environment. 
One option is to have strict rules which may be “waived” at the discretion of the SDC 
reviewers; an alternative is to have rules which are inherently flexible. What is important is 
that the uncertainty in outputs is incorporated into the rules; for example, the threshold rule 
(section 3) could be replaced by: 
 
Table cells will normally be considered non-confidential if the frequency of units is at 
least five; lower frequencies can be released if it can be demonstrated that the 
confidentiality principles (see…) would not be broken; higher frequencies may be 
required if there is insufficient variation in the data or the data can be identified with a 
small number of statistical units. 
 
This uses “may”, “insufficient”, “normally”, “small” to develop a rule of thumb, and outlines 
explicitly where “grey areas” arise. It puts the onus on the researcher to argue for a lower 
limit; in contrast, the responsibility for arguing for a higher limit is implicitly the SDC guardian. 
 
Most importantly, the direct reference to some principle of confidentiality contrasts with the 
mechanistic threshold rule developed in Section 3. It acknowledges that this rule cannot 
exist independently, and that any output needs to be seen in an appropriate context.  
 
So, although it may be desirable to have an independent standard, rules no longer have to 
stand by themselves. The problem then is how to avoid every release of data needing to be 
scrutinised to make sure it complies with these “fuzzy” rules. This is where the education of 
researchers and SDC practitioners becomes important. 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Model-based reasoning 
 
In research environments a large part of output comes in some form of “analytical outputs” 
(defined as non-linear aggregates of data). The difficulty is the infinite potential of 
researchers to manipulate data. It was noted above that this approach is similar to trying to 
guess how to build a home for an unknown animal. Do an infinite set of rules need to be 
developed? 
 
Our approach is to realise that, in practice, there are a relatively small number of “animal 
types”. If we can group animals into classes (things that fly; things that dig; things that climb; 
things that eat people), then the development of appropriate procedures is greatly simplified. 
While there are an unlimited set of actual animals, the characteristics of an animal are, by 
and large, all known. 
 
This is the major change in SDC required for research environments: to look at the process 
of producing outputs, rather than the outputs themselves. We do not look at data for 
disclosiveness, but for the way that data is used. We call this “model-based” reasoning, and 
contrast it with “data-based” reasoning.  
 
Consider a simple linear regression. A traditional approach would be to draw up rules 
concerning outliers, influential points, categorical variables, goodness-of-fit, use of public 
data, and so on. This rapidly becomes very complicated: for example, the inclusion of 
influential points in a regression may make for bad statistics but it does not necessarily make 
the regression disclosive. 
 
In contrast, an analysis of the functional form of a linear regression reveals that regressions 
are almost always non-disclosive; that the problem cases are a small identified set; that most 
of the problems are due to the co-publication of means and totals; that a simple check on the 
disclosiveness of data exists; and so does a simple correction to make any regression non-
disclosive irrespective of the data used (see Ritchie (2006a) for details). The analysis is 
straightforward, and the conclusions are clear. Specific examples of outputs of the type 
“Regression” can then checked relatively easily. 
 
The problem, then, is not as bad as it seems. It is possible to shuffle whole swathes of 
potential output into relatively few classes whose properties can be studied. This does not 
mean that disclosure control becomes easier; for example, although percentiles can be 
treated as tables, the ordering of the categories presents a different issue of identification. 
However, it does mean that the rules used for SDC can be kept small, manageable, and 
comprehensible. 
 
Model-based reasoning also can help to direct attention onto the most “dangerous” outputs. 
Model analysis will demonstrate that some outputs are inherently liable to disclosure 
problems. In these cases, the particular instance needs to be reviewed in detail. For “safer” 
outputs, a limited checklist might be sufficient to demonstrate confidentiality is met. 
Returning to the zoo analogy, each lion and sheep is different. Resource-strapped 
zookeepers concentrate on understanding the individual lions, because the potential for 
damage from failure to observe properly is so much greater. 
 
Finally, rules are based upon functional form may be able to stand independently: 
 
A linear regression is non-disclosive if at least one coefficient is effectively 
suppressed; that is, it could not reasonably be determined from published information 
(Ritchie 2006b). 
 
Within this context we can also put tabular analysis in its proper place. Linear aggregations 
are inherently unsafe because of the potential for disclosure by differencing. As the method 
of generating the tables cannot be approved, the outputs must meet the appropriate 
standard: 
 
Tables and other linear aggregations may not be released unless they can be shown 
to meet confidentiality guidelines. 
 
This makes clear that tables per se are unacceptable; a reason needs to be given for their 
release, involving direct application of the confidentiality principle. Note that it does not 
preclude outputs being released; it just shifts the burden of proof. No longer is there a rule 
stating that tables will be released if it meets certain criteria. Now a table will not be released 
unless it can be demonstrated to meet the criteria. This is a subtle but important change in 
emphasis. 
 
5.4 Education 
 
If the SDC rules to be applied embody an element of judgement, it is essential that the 
researchers are well-informed about disclosure detection and control. This education needs 
to include the principles, any rules and how they are derived from the principles, and how the 
rules are applied and interpreted. Without guidelines on interpretation, it may be difficult to 
achieve consistency, and researchers may be irritated or confused by apparently arbitrary 
decisions. In contrast, educated researchers will be more able to predict acceptable outputs, 
should understand the reason for non-approval of outputs, and should avoid burdening the 
output checkers with large amounts of unacceptable outputs. 
  
It is clear that this makes SDC much more of a co-operative effort between researchers and 
the SDC team. This is deliberate: the aim is to make both parties share the same goal, the 
efficient release of non-disclosive data. Researchers want results to be cleared quickly. The 
SDC team wants results to be cleared accurately. These objectives are not incompatible if 
both understand and agree the principles and standards to which outputs must adhere. 
 
There are other advantages. First, when new situations arise (for example a novel functional 
form which the SDC team has no rules or examples for), it means the SDC team and the 
researchers can work together to develop appropriate guidelines. Second, by drawing in 
researchers to develop the framework, it provides instant feedback on the appropriateness 
of SDC methods. Finally, the research environment provides direct access to experienced 
and proficient analysts. It seems a shame to ignore this source of ongoing peer reviews. 
 
There are dangers in integrating researchers into the SDC framework. Most importantly, the 
SDC team needs to have the confidence and ability to defend its position. One could 
envisage a drift towards increasingly relaxed control as an ill-prepared SDC team is 
browbeaten into accepting lower and lower standards. One part of the solution is to make 
clear that the responsibility for final decisions rests with the SDC team, so that in matters of 
risk and interpretation of principle the NSI has the final say. A second part is to ensure that 
the NSI’s rules are reviewed periodically and independently. 
 
This does not mean that statistical differences cannot be debated; but researchers wishing 
to challenge rules need to be aware that it is their responsibility to prove that a better method 
exists. Neither does it give the NSI licence to ignore suggestions for change. If the SDC 
team has insufficient technical knowledge, it needs to make a reasonable attempt to bridge 
the gap in understanding; otherwise the trust between the parties breaks down. 
 
Hence, an important function of education is to ensure that there is a positive relationship 
between the NSI and researchers. As Desai (2004) notes 
 
“The best form of security is a good relationship with your users, if they feel they 
have a stake rather than being in the supplicant position they are more likely to act 
responsibly.” 
Desai (2004, p5) 
 
It has been argued that the involvement of researchers in SDC is dangerous: it gives them 
useful information about how to break the system. We do not consider this a valid argument. 
First, an ill-intentioned researcher can find much easier ways to remove data from a lab than 
by trying to get results past disclosure control3. 
 
Second, if all output goes through SDC, than a malevolent researcher could edit outputs 
enough to make result looks acceptable under any rules. Would a hard-pressed SDC team 
notice a deliberately fraudulent output? 
 
Third, and most importantly, the discussion here is about involving researchers in the 
detection of disclosive results, and educating them in some of the things that can be done. 
Most NSIs provide some information about detection and control methods, and only decline 
to discuss details of particular controls applied to specific outputs. The same applies here. 
Moreover, the aim of schooling researchers in detection is to avoid control becoming 
necessary through better outputs. 
 
5.5 Practicalities 
 
The implementation of this approach does raise three particular concerns, relating to the 
volume of outputs and the skills of the NSI. 
 
First, this strategy implies little scope for automatic SDC methods, even for linear 
aggregates. This implies that the volume of SDC work increases linearly with the amount of 
research done. As one aim of having effective SDC procedures is to encourage research, 
this potentially could be counter-productive for the NSI. 
 
Second, manual SDC checking requires a level of statistical expertise on the part of the 
checker. Even for those with a statistical background, this requires some time to develop. 
For dealing with advanced queries on releasable outputs (is a Herfindahl index safe? A Gini 
coefficient?), statistical knowledge needs to be similarly developed. However, it is likely that 
                                                 
3
  This argument may not hold for remote job submission 
those with a sufficiently developed statistical knowledge would not find SDC of other 
people’s work particularly interesting or motivating. It may be difficult to fill and fund posts.  
 
Third, the success of the model of SDC presented here depends to a large extent upon the 
relationship between the NSI and the researchers. The development of new methods, the 
avoidance of conflict over unresolved issues, the acceptability of outputs being submitted, 
are all facilitated by a good working relationship. This can founder on the NSI unawareness 
of how researchers work, or on researchers’ lack of knowledge of the restrictions under 
which the NSI operates. Both parties need to put some effort into this relationship. 
 
6. An example: business survey data research in the UK 
 
We conclude with an example from the Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML) at the UK Office 
for National Statistics (ONS). This thin-client laboratory facility provides access to sensitive 
data, mainly business microdata, to ONS, government and academic researchers. The work 
is largely analytical economics and econometrics. All outputs pass through the VML team for 
disclosure checking. 
 
One important feature of the VML is that it is designed and managed by active researchers, 
and so the development of SDC guidance by the team is informed by practical experience of 
typical outputs. This has ensured that the VML has a thriving research base despite 
operating, on the face of it, an improbably strict regime. It also helps to develop the 
relationship between the VML team and researchers, and to give the former more authority 
in their arguments. 
 
All researchers undergo a short training session. The bulk of this is taken up by SDC, and 
includes the principles, the dominance and threshold rules, and interpretation in the context 
of business data. Participatory examples are the primary teaching method both for 
researchers and VML staff, many derived from observed problems. The VML’s principles of 
disclosure control are the same as ONS, but restated in a manner more appropriate for 
researchers. 
 
Researchers are shown that outputs are grouped into “safe” and “unsafe” categories, and 
are also given guidance about what factors influence whether a “safe” output would be 
refused, or an “unsafe” output be approved. 
  
As a result of the training, BDL researchers are relatively competent in assessing the 
disclosiveness of their own outputs. It was noted in Section 5.2 that the use of soft rules 
appears to lead to every output being subject to lengthy scrutiny. In practice, this is not the 
case, as researchers made aware of the SDC framework quickly learn the messages of safe 
outputs and produce results which can be cleared quickly. However, this has in itself caused 
some problems. 
 
First, an essential part of this approach is giving researchers information about the 
parameter values used in SDC (eg dominance/uncertainty limits). Concern was expressed 
that this information could be used in other contexts to attack ONS outputs. The VML 
already used higher threshold limits than regular ONS outputs to guard against disclosure by 
differencing. This was extended to all the parameter values. The VML training now only 
discusses the VML-specific values with researchers. Researchers are informed that VML 
rules for SDC are stricter than ONS rules, and that requests for output are judged against 
VML rules only.  
 
Second, outputs are sometimes presented without the necessary data to check results (such 
as tables without underlying frequencies). These are returned to researchers with a request 
for more information, and over time, researchers learn to provide the necessary information. 
  
Third, the volume of output has increased. Some output files presented to BDL have been so 
large that the time to check the files has been significant. However confident BDL may feel in 
the capacity of the researcher to produce safe results, it retains the legal responsibility for 
ensuring that no disclosive outputs leave ONS, and as a result has refused outputs on the 
grounds of volume rather than disclosiveness. While number of outputs is a valid reason for 
refusing to release results (due to the potential for disclosure by differencing), this is not a 
very satisfactory outcome, and so BDL has had to adjust its training programme to increase 
the emphasis on the minimal set of outputs. 
 
Overall, this co-operative approach to SDC required some investment in staff and some 
effort into getting the VML message across. In the longer-term, however, it has delivered a 
low-cost, scalable, transparent SDC system, with high degree of data security and 
acceptable response times. 
 
There is generally a period of trial-and-error for all new researchers, which is often a 
frustrating time and needs to be managed carefully. Nevertheless, the overall impact of 
having an educated research group has been to significantly reduce the target release time 
for research results from two weeks in 2003 to two days in 2004. In practice, in 2007 results 
are turned around in one business day in 90% of cases, the rejection rates are roughly one 
paper per month, and the main reason for rejection is simply volume of output4. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The need to develop SDC standards for a wider range of situations is clear. The case of a 
research environment is particularly difficult because of the unpredictability of outputs. This 
makes a dependence upon an absolute standard untenable in many situations, as it does 
the use of automated tools except in a very limited number of cases. However, by 
concentrating on the structure of outputs, results can be grouped into classes of varying 
sensitivity: tables are inherently unsafe and need to be assessed individually, panel data 
estimates inherently safe, and so on. Crucially, researchers need to be aware of these 
criteria and able to apply them. 
 
While it may be hard to specify absolute rules, principles are much easier to determine and 
agree upon. These form an overarching framework against which particular cases can be 
assessed. They can also provide a cross- and inter-organisational consistency. Although the 
in-built flexibility makes a principles-based system more opaque than a rules-based one, 
there remains a common standard of judgement against which procedures can be tested. 
 
This approach, of defining principles and modelling the mathematical structure of potential 
outputs, implies a knowledgeable SDC team – one that is aware not just of data, but of 
functional forms, and how to assess novel situations. Teams need to explicitly recognise that 
the scope of SDC will expand over time, and to have systems in place to incorporate new 
developments. Learning by example therefore becomes a key part of the training program 
for SDC staff. SDC staff need to have a general familiarity with statistics and a specific 
competency in the commoner functional forms used by the relevant researchers. 
 
Finally, it is crucial that researchers are also involved in the SDC process. First, researchers 
and SDC teams have an interest in getting outputs cleared quickly, safely, and easily, and 
this is best achieved when all parties are familiar with the framework and rules; researchers 
can see a return on time invested in SDC. Second, in the more flexible world of principles-
based systems, the involvement of researchers increases the transparency of the systems 
and hence reduces the scope for confusion and disagreement. Third, researchers have an 
                                                 
4
 One researcher did ask for a 300,000 line log file to be cleared. After some thought, this was rejected. 
incentive to co-operate in the development of new rules and procedures, and are less likely 
to request novel outputs without also presenting an appropriate solution. Fourth, SDC 
training can be used to build a community of trust between researchers and SDC staff. 
 
In summary, while SDC in a research environment may not be as cleanly controlled as in 
other situations, there is ample scope to develop transparent, accessible procedures which 
can be compared against a common standard.  
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